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NOTES
 
GOVERNMENT-CONTRACTOR IMMUNITY—I’M  JUST  FOL­
LOWING ORDERS: A FAIR STANDARD OF IMMUNITY FOR MILITARY 
SERVICE CONTRACTORS 
INTRODUCTION 
For all that could be said of it, the war in Iraq has highlighted a 
number of substantial changes in the makeup and structure of the 
United States military in a theater of war.  Prominent among these 
changes is a dramatic increase in the use of private military contrac­
tors within the war zone itself.1  This substantial expansion of the 
use of service contractors within the war zone includes everything 
from maintenance, construction, and administration workers to 
armed, private, commercial soldiers or security forces.2  Contractors 
are steadily replacing enlisted, uniformed soldiers in many aspects 
of the military’s various missions.3 
Every morning in Iraq and Afghanistan, a shadow army heads 
to work in numbers equal to or greater than that of the United 
States Armed Forces.4  These men and women make up the em­
ployee base of companies contracted by the military to perform any 
of a great variety of duties.5  Many of these contractors fill jobs that 
would have been held by soldiers fifty years ago.6  Today, these ci­
vilian contractors fly the planes, clean the barracks, repair the heli­
1. See CONGRESSIONAL  BUDGET  OFFICE, CONTRACTORS’ SUPPORT OF U.S. OP­
ERATIONS IN IRAQ 12-13 (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/ 
08-12-IraqContractors.pdf [hereinafter CONTRACTOR REPORT] (noting that the ratio of 
contractor-to-soldier has reached an unprecedented level for a major military 
operation). 
2. Id. at 11 fig.5. 
3. See id. at 12 (describing the change in military policy now favoring the use of 
contractors in support roles previously filled by soldiers).  In many respects, this reflects 
a change in the size and model of the military in a post-Cold War world. Id.  It appears 
that a specialized, volunteer army is not big enough to perform all the support tasks 
necessary for an operation like the war in Iraq. See id. 
4. See id. 
5. See id. 
6. See id. 
373 
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copters, and provide security for important visitors.7  Despite the 
decreased use of its own personnel, the military8 still has an active 
hand in dictating flight patterns, passenger lists, maintenance sched­
ules, security protocols, and the job specifications for hosts of con­
tractor jobs.9  This division of labor raises an important legal issue: 
a soldier cannot sue the United States for injuries he suffers inci­
dent to his service,10 but the soldier can sue a private contractor for 
such injuries.  For example, during the Vietnam War, a soldier 
transported in a military plane flown by military pilots had no cause 
of action against the United States if his plane crashed.11  Today, 
however, a soldier in Iraq who suffers injury in the crash of a civil­
ian military contractor plane has a cause of action against the 
airline.12 
While a plane crash might be a rare event, it is an unfortunate 
fact of war that things often go wrong and many people are hurt. 
Even outside of direct combat, any endeavor as large and compli­
cated as the civilian contractor operation in Iraq is bound to pro­
duce tragedy.  In some of these cases, the genesis of the incident is 
not in the negligent execution of a task by a civilian contractor.13 
Absent negligent action, the legal analysis must go further back and 
inquire into the possibility of negligent planning.  What if the main­
tenance on a helicopter was performed adequately but the fre­
quency of the maintenance requested by the military is the origin of 
the problem?14  What if the plane was operated competently, yet 
the flight plan given to the contractor by the military exposed the 
entire flight to considerable risk?15 
7. See id. 
8. In this Note, “military” will refer to all branches of the United States Armed 
Forces as well as the civilian employees within the Department of Defense who assist 
those branches in coordinating and contracting for services in the theater of war. 
9. See, e.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1336 (11th Cir. 
2007) (noting that the military retained control over what flights would be flown, where 
to, and with who onboard, among other mission details); Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/ 
Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that the military retained control 
over the frequency and thoroughness of maintenance inspections on helicopters). 
10. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
11. See id. 
12. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1352-53 (allowing claim brought by the families of 
deceased soldiers against military-contractor airline whose plane crashed, resulting in 
the soldiers’ deaths). 
13. See, e.g., Hudgens, 328 F.3d 1329. 
14. This example is based on the facts of Hudgens. Id. at 1332. 
15. This example is based on the facts of McMahon.  502 F.3d at 1337. 
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The issue addressed in this Note is whether private military 
service contractors should be afforded any level of immunity be­
cause of their contractual relationship with the United States mili­
tary and the United States government.  Concluding that 
contractors are entitled to some immunity, this Note considers just 
how much immunity should be granted, the situations in which such 
immunity would apply, and the basis for such immunity in relation 
to existing legal concepts and policy considerations. 
Ultimately, this Note argues that military service contractors 
should be entitled to immunity in much the same way that contrac­
tors are afforded immunity in the products liability context.  This 
Note proposes that a version of the Boyle v. United Technology 
Corp. test, logically modified to suit the services industry, would 
fairly determine the applicability of this immunity.16  This test 
would shield contractors from liability when (1) the injury in ques­
tion resulted from an order, plan, or directive from the United 
States military, (2) the plan or order was executed without negli­
gence by the contractor, and (3) the contractor had disclosed to the 
United States any concerns or potential risks.17  This test presents a 
workable solution that honors the rationales that have supported 
military immunity and military products-liability immunity for more 
than fifty years while at the same time fairly leaving liability to the 
contractors when their negligent execution of a contractual duty has 
caused an injury. 
Part I of this Note discusses a changing military environment, 
touching on the expansion of the use of military contractors and the 
blurring of the lines between the private and government sectors 
when it comes to the United States’s military endeavors.18  Part II 
examines the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, which waived much of the government’s sovereign im­
munity.19  Part III addresses the landmark case Feres v. United 
States, which established protection for the United States Armed 
Forces against suit by its soldiers.  Part III also discusses the line of 
16. Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988); see infra note 139 and R 
accompanying text. 
17. See id. 
18. See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE  WARRIORS: THE  RISE OF THE  PRIVATIZED 
MILITARY INDUSTRY 217-26, 228-33 (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 2004). 
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006); Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1988) 
(stating that Congress partially waived sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims 
Act). 
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cases that expands and refines the Feres doctrine.20  Part IV of this 
Note analyzes two areas of government contracting that have estab­
lished immunity standards: civilian government contracting and mil­
itary contracting for products procurement.  Finally, Part V argues 
for a limited immunity standard for military services contractors. 
I. A CHANGING MILITARY 
The use of military contractors in war is not a modern con­
cept.21  Mercenaries were a staple of European armies until the Cri­
mean War in 1853.22  The English army that was sent against 
American revolutionaries was no exception and included almost 
30,000 “Hessian” Germans.23  The United States began using mili­
tary contractors in that same war, before the country was even 
founded.24 
The history of contractors in American wars is not one of 
steady escalation but instead has fluctuated and changed over the 
years.25  The highest level of contractor use was in World War II, 
20. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). See generally David 
Seidelson, From Feres v. United States to Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: An Ex­
amination of Supreme Court Jurisprudence and a Couple of Suggestions, 32 DUQ. L. 
REV. 219 (1994); John Astley, Note, United States v. Johnson: Feres Doctrine Gets New 
Life and Continues to Grow, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 185 (1988). 
21. See SINGER, supra note 18, at 19. R 
22. See id. at 32-33. 
23. Id. at 33.  The “Hessians” were a group of German mercenaries hired by the 
British during the Revolutionary War.  They were given their name by American mili­
tiamen based on the majority of the mercenaries being from the Hesse-Kassel region of 
Germany. Id. 
24. CONTRACTOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. R 
25. See id. at 13 tbl.2. 
The following table shows the ratio of contractor personnel to military personnel in 
armed conflicts the United States has participated in: 
377 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-2\WNE204.txt unknown Seq: 5 24-MAY-10 13:53 
2010] IMMUNITY FOR MILITARY SERVICE CONTRACTORS 
with approximately 734,000 contractors on the ground.26  To com­
pare, there are approximately 190,000 contractors on the ground in 
Iraq.27  The difference in the size of the conflicts, however, cannot 
be understated.  With few variations, the ratio of contractors to en-
Presence of Contractor Personnel During U.S. Military Operations (in thousands) 
Conflict Contractor Personnel Military Personnel Ratio 
Revolutionary War 2 9 1 to 6 
War of 1812 n.a. 38 n.a. 
Mexican-American War 6 33 1 to 6 
Civil War 200 1,000 1 to 5 
Spanish-American War n.a. 35 n.a. 
World War I 85 2,000 1 to 24 
World War II 734 5,400 1 to 7 
Korean War 156 393 1 to 2.5 
Vietnam War 70 359 1 to 5 
Gulf War 9* 500 1 to 55* 
Balkans 20 20 1 to 1 
Iraq Theater as of Early 2008 190 200 1 to 1 
* “The government of Saudi Arabia provided significant amounts of products and services 
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  Personnel associated with those pro­
visions are not included in the data or the ratio.” Id. 
Id. (modified from table 2). 
ESTIMATED RATIO OF CONTRACTOR TO MILITARY PERSONNEL 
1.2 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0 
World World Korea Vietnam Balkans Iraq 
War I War II 
See id. (Gulf War data excluded due to the omission of the Saudi contribution, which skews 
the data). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
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listed personnel has increased steadily with each conflict in which 
the United States has engaged.28 
While 5.4 million United States soldiers were deployed in 
World War II, only 200,000 have been deployed in Iraq.29  This 
leaves the ratio of contractor-to-military in World War II at roughly 
one-to-seven.30  In Iraq, however, this number has risen to approxi­
mately one to one.31  The use of military and government contrac­
tors in the United States’s current operation in Iraq is at record 
levels.32  The United States currently has approximately as many 
contractors in the Iraq theater as it does uniformed servicemen.33 
This record use of contractors extends to security forces and 
armed private military forces, which account for expenditures of be­
tween $500 million and $1.2 billion annually.34  An estimated $32 
billion worth of United States’s contracts in Iraq have required the 
use of nonmilitary security.35  The use of such security forces costs 
roughly the same per person as the use of a uniformed soldier, al­
though the nature of a contracted security force makes it a more 
financially flexible option for peacetime.36 
The expanded use of contractors—especially armed contrac­
tors for security and pseudomilitary activities—frames the context 
within which this Note is written.  Numerous concerns surround the 
nature of these contractors, their legal designations, their roles, and 
what their expanded existence means for twenty-first-century war 
and the twenty-first-century United States military.37  Specific con­
cerns include the lack of contractor regulation and the lack of a 
clear definition of a contractor’s legal status.38  The record level of 
28. See id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. See Mike Mount, Report: U.S. Using Contractors in Iraq at Unprecedented 
Rate, CNNPOLITICS.COM, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/12/ 
iraq.contractors/index.html. 
33. CONTRACTOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 13 tbl.2. R 
34. Id. at 13-14. 
35. Id. at 14. 
36. Id.  The full analysis of this comparison is available in Box 2 of the report. 
See id. at 16-17. 
37. See SINGER, supra note 18, at 217-26, 228-33; see also P.W. Singer, Warriors R 
for Hire in Iraq, SALON.COM, Apr. 15, 2004, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/ 
04/15/warriors/index.html; cf. Ian Traynor, The Privatisation of War, THE  GUARDIAN, 
Dec. 10, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/10/politics.iraq (providing a 
British perspective on the phenomenon in both the British and American armies). 
38. See SINGER, supra note 18, at 228-29.  Singer’s primary concern is that in an R 
unregulated market for contracted military forces, where contractors live and work in a 
379 
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outsourcing and intertwining of the military and its contractors dur­
ing the Iraq war reveals a military significantly different than the 
one for which existing legal principles of military contractor immu­
nity was built. 
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FTCA 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity far predates the founding 
of the United States.  It is based on the notion that the King, as the 
“font of the law,” is not bound by the law; and that the King, as the 
“font of justice,” cannot be sued in his own courts.39  In practical 
and modern terms, sovereign immunity shields the United States 
from civil suit and criminal prosecution.40  In the United States, the 
federal government was immune from tort actions for more than a 
century before Congress passed legislation that waived the immu­
nity for certain torts and established jurisdiction in the federal 
courts over certain types of claims made against the government.41 
This legislation came in the form of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), which authorized suit against the government for torts 
nebulous legal gray area, they become unreliable servants to the public good, no better 
than government organs, and potentially much worse. Id.  It is possible that a clearly 
defined legal status for contractors is part of the solution to this problem.  A simple and 
predictable system distributing liability for the various things that occur in military 
zones could be a very important element of accountability for these organizations. 
39. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102-03 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Sovereign immunity took form in the thirteenth century as part of English common law 
under the reign of Henry III. Id. at 103.  The two-prong basis of sovereign immunity 
(that the King could do no wrong and that he could not be sued in his own court) 
existed through the Middle Ages and made its way in some form to the United States. 
Id.  The version of sovereign immunity that exists in the United States today does not 
retain both prongs as its basis and rationale. See id.  The idea that the King (or, in this 
case, the United States) can do no wrong has certainly faded if it ever truly existed. Id.; 
see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).  The United States is held account­
able for numerous wrongs today in its own courts. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140.  The element 
of sovereign immunity that has survived—to an extent—is that the King cannot be sued 
in his own court. Id. at 139.  In many cases, the United States has consented to suit in 
its courts (for example, through the FTCA), but it still retains the basic presumption 
that, barring its consent, it cannot be sued. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475-77 
(1994). 
40. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (“The United States, 
as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.”); Cohens v. Virginia, 
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821) (“[A] sovereign independent State is not suable, 
except by its own consent.”). 
41. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953), abrogated by Rayonier, 
Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957).  Congress had already waived sovereign 
immunity for several types of claims and had a court established to hear such claims 
but, in general, had not waived its immunity from standard common law torts. Id. at 25 
n.10. 
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which would have been in violation of the local law had they been 
committed by an individual.42  The FTCA consisted of two main 
components: the first was a waiver of sovereign immunity,43 and the 
second was a list of exceptions for which the United States retained 
its sovereign immunity.44  Of the many exceptions to the FTCA’s 
waiver of sovereign immunity, the two most relevant to this Note 
are the discretionary-function exception45 and the combatant-activi­
ties exception.46  The discretionary-function exception preserves 
the United States’s immunity from claims based on injuries attribu­
table to the actions of federal officials making discretionary deci­
sions, generally involving political or social policy.47  The 
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006); Feres, 340 U.S. at 139-40; Gonzalez-Rucci v. INS, 460 
F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (D.P.R. 2006). 
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1346.  The language of the statute provides that the United States 
district courts 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United 
States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or 
loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrong­
ful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the 
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United 
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with 
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 
Id. § 1346(b)(1). 
44. Id. § 2680.  The exceptions include instances where a discretionary function 
was performed by a United States official; where mail was lost or negligently handled 
by the United States Postal Service; where taxes, fees, or detention of goods by customs 
agents was involved; where damages were allegedly caused by actions of the United 
States Treasury; where injuries were suffered in connection with combatant activities; 
and where claims arose in other countries. Id.; see also United States v. S.A. Empresa 
de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 820-21 (1984) (holding that the discre­
tionary-function exception to the FTCA barred a claim against the Federal Aviation 
Administration alleging that it had negligently certified aircraft for flight); Kandarge v. 
United States, 849 F. Supp. 304, 311 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding that the discretionary func­
tion barred a suit against the United States where it had made the choice to delegate 
worksite safety at an excavation to a private contractor). 
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).  The exception applies to 
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, 
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not 
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the 
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not 
the discretion involved be abused. 
Id. 
46. Id. § 2680(j).  The exception applies to “[a]ny claim arising out of the combat­
ant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.” 
Id. 
47. The discretionary-function exception was intended to prevent judicial intru­
sion into the government’s decision-making process in areas of public policy.  Riley v. 
United States, 486 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2007).  To establish the applicability of the 
discretionary-function exception, the government first must demonstrate that there was 
381 
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combatant-activities exception generally precludes claims arising 
out of wartime combat.48 
In sum, by waiving the United States’s sovereign immunity, ex­
cept in limited instances, the FTCA expanded the scope of claims 
that could be brought against the United States.  Despite this 
waiver, however, many claims remain statutorily barred by the ex­
ceptions to the FTCA and thus will go uncompensated.49  This pro­
tection of federal interests from the intrusion of state tort law 
foreshadows many of the arguments that are central to this Note. 
While the FTCA makes some concessions to state tort principles,50 
it carves out a reserve of federal interests that are statutorily pro­
tected.51  The conflict between the protection of federal interests 
and the rights of individuals to seek redress for their injuries under­
lies all of the conflict and controversy of the topic of this Note.52 
III. FERES AND THE FOUNDATION OF MILITARY IMMUNITY 
Four years after the passage of the FTCA, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Feres v. United States.53  In Feres, the Court 
held that the United States military was not liable for soldiers’ inju­
an action by the United States that “involv[ed] an element of judgment or choice.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Second, it has to be shown that the action impacts 
social, economic, or political policy. Id.  In Riley, the court dismissed a claim against 
the United States that alleged that the United States Postal Service’s placement of mail­
boxes obscured the view of traffic and led to an automobile accident. Id.  In effect, the 
discretionary-function exception is a statutory embodiment of the separation of powers. 
See Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (“[T]here is 
evidence within the FTCA’s legislative history that such fundamental separation of 
powers dogma is precisely what the discretionary function exception was designed to 
embody.”). 
48. See Redmond v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 1222, 1223-24 (N.D. Ill. 1971). 
49. For example, see Miller v. United States, in which a woman brought a claim 
for infliction of emotional distress after alleged medical malpractice resulted in the 
death of her husband—a military officer.  73 F.3d 878, 879 (9th Cir. 1995).  The claim 
was barred by an exception to the FTCA because it occurred in a foreign country. Id. 
at 883. 
50. This concession comes in the form of making itself liable to injuries—save for 
those excepted—if they would be deemed tortious by the laws of the place they were 
committed; that is, the states.  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 
51. Id. § 2680.  This reservation goes against the basic principle of the American 
legal system that an injury deserves a remedy. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a settled and invariable principle, that . . . every injury 
[must have] its proper redress.”). 
52. See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 
797, 808 (1984) (“The discretionary function exception . . . marks the boundary between 
Congress’s willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to 
protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals.”). 
53. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
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ries suffered incident to service.54  The original Feres complaint al­
leged that the military’s negligence in housing Feres in barracks 
with a defective heating plant and failure to maintain adequate fire-
prevention measures resulted in his death.55  In barring Feres’s 
claim, the Court gave broad immunity to the military for injuries 
arising in the course of a soldier’s duties, whether those duties were 
performed in peacetime or wartime and whether the duties were 
pedestrian or high risk.56 
The rationale for the decision in Feres was originally two pro­
nged.57  The first prong—or “Feres factor,” as referred to by later 
courts58—was based on the notion that the military is an entirely 
federal concern and required uniform policies independent of the 
state where the soldier served.59  The second Feres factor was the 
recognition that federal statutes already provided “simple, certain, 
and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in armed 
services.”60  The Court has held that these compensation schemes 
54. Id. at 146. 
55. Id. at 137. Feres was actually a decision for three separate cases; the opinion 
also included Jefferson v. United States and Griggs v. United States. Id. at 136-37.  The 
actual Feres case came about after Rudolph Feres was required by his superior officers 
to live in a barracks in Pine Camp, New York.  Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535, 536 
(2d Cir. 1949), aff’d, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).  The barracks had a defective heating plant, 
which the complaint alleged was known or should have been known by the superior 
officers. Id.  The complaint also alleged negligence on the part of the barracks’s fire 
watch and its supervisors. Id. 
The Jefferson claim stemmed from a surgery performed by an Army surgeon at 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia.  Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 519 (4th Cir. 1949), 
aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135.  A towel was left in Jefferson’s 
body, resulting in serious injuries. Id.  The claim brought on behalf of Dudley Griggs’s 
widow in Griggs v. United States was similar; it alleged that the Army Medical Corps at 
Scott Field Air Base, Illinois negligently executed a surgical procedure—a procedure 
that proved to be fatal.  Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1949), rev’d sub 
nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135. 
56. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1341 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
57. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-45. 
58. See, e.g., Mossow v. United States, 987 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1993). 
59. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143-44. 
60. Id. at 144.  For injuries, the disability plan allows for an increasing monthly 
compensation based on a percentage rating of disability.  38 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1131, 1134 
(2006).  For example, someone rated ten percent disabled is entitled to $117 per month; 
someone rated fifty percent disabled is entitled to $728 per month; and a fully (one 
hundred percent) disabled person is entitled to $2,527 per month. Id. § 1114.  There are 
other, more specific provisions, which can further increase this amount. Id.  In in­
stances of death, the military compensation scheme provides for a $100,000 death gratu­
ity paid out to the family of the deceased.  10 U.S.C. §§ 1475-79.  The military can also 
pay various expenses associated with death, including the cost of cremation, the 
purchase of a casket, and others. Id. § 1482.  Subsequently, the surviving spouse can 
383 
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represent a cap on the military’s liability to its soldiers and consti­
tute the only means of relief for injured servicemen.61  These two 
factors formed the basis of the decision in Feres and the initial back­
bone of military immunity jurisprudence. 
Feres has not been without its opponents.  Critics have raised 
many arguments against it over time, the strongest perhaps over the 
inequity of the process it entails.62  In terms of both compensating 
the injured and deterring future negligence, the Feres decision is 
often found to be lacking.63  Despite the complaints, the Feres doc­
trine has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases and is still good law.64 
A. Brown, Johnson, and the Third Feres Factor 
The Supreme Court added a third factor four years later in 
United States v. Brown.65  There, the Court expressed concern 
about the dangers posed to military discipline by the litigation of 
claims brought by servicemen and servicewomen.66  In Brown, a 
discharged soldier alleged medical negligence at a Veterans’ Ad­
ministration Hospital during his surgery to correct an injury in­
curred during military service.67  The Court read into the Feres 
receive monthly payments that vary based on the rank of the deceased soldier, starting 
at $1,091 per month.  38 U.S.C. § 1311.  There are other available per-month increases, 
including for disabled surviving spouses and dependent children. Id. 
61. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144; see Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 
460, 464 (1980) (stating that the Veterans’ Benefit Act is believed to represent the ex­
clusive route of compensation to injured servicemen); Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977) (holding that the existing benefits package rep­
resents a limitation on recovery); see also United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690 
(1987) (reaffirming these positions and noting the lack of a statutory amendment by 
Congress in over four decades in response to this interpretation). 
62. Edwin F. Hornbrook & Eugene J. Kirschbaum, The Feres Doctrine: Here To-
day—Gone Tomorrow?, 33 A.F. L. REV. 1, 11-15 (1990). 
63. See id. at 11-15 (listing in a point-counterpoint method the arguments over 
the inequitable nature of the Feres doctrine).  While soldiers lose the right to win large 
judgments in state court, they do have a benefits system set up to compensate them. Id. 
at 12.  While it “pale[s] next to multimillion dollar judgments, the military benefits sys­
tem compares favorably to other benefits programs.” Id.  One of the more lasting and 
practical complaints against Feres has been the preclusion of medical malpractice claims 
by active-duty soldiers. See id. at 16-18 (detailing legislative efforts to change the Feres 
doctrine as applies to medical malpractice claims); see also Rob Perez, Active Duty 
Military Can’t Sue for Malpractice, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Feb. 7, 2006, available at 
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2006/Feb/07/ln/FP602070329.html (showing 
that this is still a concern today). 
64. See Johnson, 481 U.S. 681. 
65. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 110-12 (1954). 
66. Id. at 112. 
67. Id. at 110.  In United States v. Brown, Brown alleged that a defective tourni­
quet was used on him in an operation by the Veterans’ Administration that occurred 
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decision a recognition of both the special nature of military disci­
pline and the potential untoward results of litigating allegedly negli­
gent command decisions or orders.68  The Court found that the 
Feres Court had read the FTCA to exclude claims that involved the 
“peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superior.”69 
The Brown Court ultimately decided that Feres did not control in 
that case and thus provided little analysis of what eventually be­
came the predominant Feres factor: military discipline.70 
The Court more fully addressed the third factor in 1977 in 
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States.71 Stencel Aero in­
volved a fighter pilot who suffered serious injury when his aircraft 
malfunctioned.72  The case presented a new situation for the Court 
because the pilot also sued the manufacturer, a military contractor, 
who then cross-claimed against the military.73  The district court 
ruled in favor of the United States on the claims of both the officer 
and Stencel Aero.74  Stencel Aero appealed this decision and in do­
ing so provided the Court an opportunity to address the Feres fac­
tors in relation to nonmilitary claimants.75  Notably, the Court 
analyzed the third factor, military discipline, and found no practical 
difference to the military-discipline question if the claim came from 
a serviceman or a third party.76  The Court found that “[t]he litiga­
tion would take virtually the identical form in either case, and at 
issue would be the degree of fault, if any, on the part of the Govern­
ment’s agents and the effect upon the serviceman’s safety.”77  In 
after his discharge from the military. Id.  He suffered from severe and permanent nerve 
damage in his leg because of the alleged negligence. Id. at 110-11. 
68. Id. at 112. 
69. Id. 
The Feres decision . . . [held] that the Tort Claims Act does not cover injuries 
to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity 
incident to service.  The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his 
superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the 
extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were al­
lowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of 
military duty, led the Court to read that Act as excluding claims of that 
character. 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
70. See id. 
71. Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). 
72. Id. at 667. 
73. See id. at 668. 
74. Id. at 668-69. 
75. Id. at 669-70. 
76. Id. at 673. 
77. Id. 
385 
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practical terms, the Court noted that no matter who brought the 
suit, the trial would inherently involve questioning military decision 
making and officers testifying to their decisions and the decisions of 
other officers.78  The Court’s decision to reject the third-party claim 
is another in a line of cases in which the relief is precluded for the 
purpose of protecting the national interests of the United States— 
in the form of its military.79 
In contrast, Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Stencel 
Aero did not recognize any military-discipline issues at play.80  Jus­
tice Marshall argued that, because it was a third-party claim and not 
one by a soldier, there was no risk to military discipline.81  He fur­
ther argued that the majority’s position created inconsistent results 
because a civilian could bring a claim while a soldier’s claim would 
be barred when both of their injuries stemmed from the exact same 
event.82  Justice Marshall’s conception of the military-discipline fac­
tor appeared to be rooted in an older view of the military-discipline 
factor that was concerned primarily with the dangers of a 
subordinate bringing suit against a superior officer.83  Over time, 
78. Id.  “The trial would, in either case, involve second-guessing military orders, 
and would often require members of the Armed Services to testify in court as to each 
other’s decisions and actions.” Id. 
79. See id. at 673-74.  The Court found the claim barred because the same factors 
justifying the barring of Feres-type claims were present and potent in Stencel Aero’s 
claim. Id.  Here the Court showed judicial flexibility—the kind that will be called for 
by this Note—to protect important federal interests. 
80. Id. at 676 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall stated, 
It is clear that the basis of Feres was the Court’s concern with the disruption of 
“[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors” that 
might result if the soldier were allowed to hale his superiors into court.  That 
problem does not arise when a nonmilitary third party brings suit. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
Had the same malfunction in the pilot eject system that caused the service­
man’s injuries here also caused that system to plunge into a civilian’s house, 
the injured civilian would unquestionably have a cause of action under the 
Tort Claims Act against the Government.  He might also sue petitioner, which 
might, as it has done here, cross-claim against the Government.  In that hypo­
thetical case, as well as in the case before us, there would be the same chance 
that the trial would involve second-guessing military orders, and would . . . 
require members of the Armed Services to testify in court as to each other’s 
decisions and actions.  Yet there would be no basis, in Feres or in the Tort 
Claims Act, for concluding that the suit is barred because of the nature of the 
evidence to be produced at trial. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
83. See id. at 674-77. 
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and notably in the cases that follow, the military-discipline factor 
firmly takes on an evolved role in military-immunity doctrine. 
Subsequent cases have reaffirmed and refined the usage of this 
factor as a policy basis for the Feres ruling and military immunity.84 
In United States v. Shearer, the Court further underscored the im­
portance of this factor by articulating the way that such claims, by 
their very nature, would involve the judiciary in military affairs in a 
way that could compromise military discipline.85  Two years later, in 
United States v. Johnson, the Court expanded and developed this 
notion, stating that “[e]ven if military negligence is not specifically 
alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related activity 
necessarily implicates the military judgments and decisions that are 
inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the military mission.”86 
In Johnson, a Coast Guard officer died during a rescue mission, and 
his wife brought a claim against the government.87  The Court re­
affirmed the Feres ruling and held that the government was not lia­
ble for the death of the Coast Guard officer during his service.88 
The Court also noted that “[b]ecause Johnson was acting pursuant 
to standard operating procedures of the Coast Guard, the potential 
that [the] suit could implicate military discipline [was] 
substantial.”89 
The Court also addressed the military-discipline and command 
factor in United States v. Stanley.90  In the long line of cases in which 
84. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987); United States v. Shearer, 
473 U.S. 52 (1985). 
85. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 59. 
The plaintiffs in Feres and Stencel Aero Engineering did not contest the wis­
dom of broad military policy; nevertheless, the Court held that their claims did 
not fall within the Tort Claims Act because they were the type of claims that, if 
generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at 
the expense of military discipline and effectiveness. 
Id. 
86. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691.  As well, the Johnson Court quotes its past decisions 
in categorizing the military as “a specialized society.” Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 
U.S. 733, 743 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court noted that “[t]o 
accomplish its mission the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commit­
ment, and esprit de corps.” Id. (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 
(1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
87. Id. at 683. 
88. Id. at 692. 
89. Id. at 691-92.  Also in light of the Feres factors, namely that of the existing 
statutory-benefits scheme, the Court pointed out that the decedent’s wife had re­
ceived—and continued to receive—benefits from the government because of her hus­
band’s death. Id.  The wife was receiving $868 per month for dependency and 
compensation benefits. Id. at 683 n.1. 
90. 483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
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no remedy has been available because of the priority given to fed­
eral interests, Stanley may be the most egregious example.  James 
Stanley, a Master Sergeant in the United States Army, was 
deceived and used as an experimental subject by the Army in its 
process of testing the effects of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).91 
At the time of the experiments, Stanley was unaware that he was a 
test subject.92  Over time, Stanley’s personality changed, resulting in 
the deterioration of his work performance, the subsequent dis­
charge from the Army, and a divorce from his wife.93  Stanley suf­
fered from hallucinations, memory loss, and became violent 
towards his family.94  Despite the inhumane treatment by the 
United States Army and the way in which its actions completely 
destroyed Stanley’s life, the Court still held in favor of the 
government.95 
In Stanley, the Court stated that making the applicability of 
Feres dependent on case-by-case analysis of how seriously a claim 
would threaten military discipline would not work.  Such a test 
would inherently require the Court to intrude on military matters in 
the process of evaluating the potential interference.96  Notably, the 
court held that “the mere process of arriving at correct conclusions 
would disrupt the military regime.”97  The Court went on to note 
that such uninvited intrusions were inappropriate.98  It is ultimately 
the concerns about military discipline, military decision making, 
and the unique nature of the military that form the basis of the 
decision in Stanley; the other Feres factors are not nearly as pro­
nounced.99  This result shows the importance the Court places on 
91. Id. at 671. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 686.  The gravity of the injuries was not lost on the Court, as evidenced 
by the opinions of Justices Brennan and O’Connor. See id. at 686-708 (Brennan, J., 
concurring and dissenting); id. at 708-10 (O’Connor, J., concurring and dissenting). 
96. Id. at 682 (majority opinion). 
A test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular suits would 
call into question military discipline and decisionmaking would itself require 
judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters.  Whether a 
case implicates those concerns would often be problematic, raising the pros­
pect of compelled depositions and trial testimony by military officers concern­
ing the details of their military commands. 
Id. at 682-83. 
97. Id. at 683. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 683-84; see Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(“Since Stencel, it has become clear that the third factor described above [concern for 
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protecting federal interests—specifically in the context of the 
military. 
While the deference to the government provided by the Feres 
doctrine is very strong, the question remains as to how it could be 
applied to the same interests (military decision making and disci­
pline) present in military-contractor relations.  To answer this ques­
tion, an analysis of government-contractor immunity is necessary. 
IV. GOVERNMENT-CONTRACTOR IMMUNITY AND DERIVATIVE
 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
 
Outside of the military realm, there is an extensive history of 
derivative sovereign immunity for those acting at the will of the 
government.100  In Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., the Su­
preme Court held that an agent of the government was not amena­
ble to suit when carrying out the will of Congress.101  In such cases, 
the Court held, the only way for the agent to be liable would be if 
he acted outside the bounds of his authority or if there was no legit­
imate power to give that authority.102 
military discipline] is the principal justification for the Feres-Stencel doctrine.”).  For a 
discussion on the emergence of military discipline as the primary category for consider­
ation of Feres doctrine positions, see Seidelson, supra note 20, at 226-30. R 
100. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940) (holding that, 
on citizen’s action against government contractor who had damaged part of citizen’s 
land in the process of performing its duties, contractor could not be sued if it satisfacto­
rily carried out the contractual obligations set by the United States); see also Myers v. 
United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that no liability could be im­
posed upon a government contractor for damage done to the property of the appellant 
when appellee was acting within the terms of its contract with the United States); Green 
v. ICI Am., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1265 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (holding that the government 
contractor operating a United States-owned TNT plant shared the United States’s sov­
ereign immunity in claims related to the plant and thus could not be sued). 
101. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20-21 (“[I]f this authority to carry out the project was 
validly conferred, that is, if what was done was within the constitutional power of Con­
gress, there is no liability on the part of the contractor for executing its will.”); see also 
Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 283 (1855) (cited 
in Yearsley and holding that a public agent acting within his bounds “cannot be made 
responsible in a judicial tribunal for obeying the lawful command of the government”). 
102. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20-21; see also Myers, 323 F.2d at 583 (holding that a 
contractor building roads for the government within the parameters of its instructions 
was not liable for any claims).  An important element of contractor immunity is the 
consistent requirement that the contractor be acting within its bounds.  The courts have 
held that a contractor should never be immune from suits based in injuries caused by 
the contractor’s own fault. See Foster v. Day & Zimmermann Inc., 502 F.2d 867, 874 
(8th Cir. 1974) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity may not be extended to cover the 
fault of a private corporation, no matter how intimate its connection with the 
government.”). 
389 
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An interesting example of derivative immunity was presented 
in the Fourth Circuit case Butters v. Vance International, Inc.103  In 
Butters, the Saudi government rejected the female plaintiff’s appli­
cation for full-time employment as a security guard.104  The Saudi 
government rejected her because it would have violated its Islamic 
principles to have a female security officer.105  Butters then brought 
a claim of gender discrimination against the United States security 
company.106  The court ultimately found that, because the decision 
not to hire Butters was made by the Saudi government and was a 
noncommercial decision particular to the sovereign, the security 
company derived the sovereign immunity of Saudi Arabia and was 
thus immune from suit by Butters.107  The court noted that it is 
“well-settled law that contractors and common law agents acting 
within the scope of their employment for the United States have 
derivative sovereign immunity.”108  While this “well-settled law” 
applied generally to government contractors, contractor immunity 
tailored specifically to military contractors developed in the area of 
military products procurement. 
A. Military Contractor Immunity—Products Liability 
The Fourth Circuit established military-contractor immunity in 
Tozer v. LTV Corp.109 Tozer was another case of military aviation 
disaster, involving a crashed Navy airplane.110  A substantial por­
tion of the court’s argument was based in a concern for the separa­
103. Butters v. Vance Int’l, Inc., 225 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2000). 
104. Id. at 464. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 465-67. 
108. Id. at 466.  The court went on to state, 
Sovereign immunity exists because it is in the public interest to protect the 
exercise of certain governmental functions.  This public interest remains intact 
when the government delegates that function down the chain of command.  As 
a result, courts define the scope of sovereign immunity by the nature of the 
function being performed—not by the office or the position of the particular 
employee involved.  Imposing liability on private agents of the government 
would directly impede the significant governmental interest in the completion 
of its work.  As a result, courts have extended derivative immunity to private 
contractors, “particularly in light of the government’s unquestioned need to 
delegate governmental functions.” 
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1448 (4th 
Cir. 1996)); see Daniel G. Murphy et al., Parallel Proceedings: Moving into Cyberspace, 
35 INT’L LAW. 491, 504-05 (2001). 
109. 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986). 
110. Id. at 404. 
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tion of powers.111  The court noted that “[t]he judicial branch is by 
design the least involved in military matters” and that “[i]n the face 
of a ‘textually demonstrable’ commitment of an issue to ‘a coordi­
nate political department,’ judicial caution is advisable.”112  The 
court quoted from Gilligan v. Morgan, a 1973 Supreme Court deci­
sion, stating that “[t]he complex, subtle, and professional decisions 
as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military 
force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always 
to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.”113 
The court also pointed out that even if there was no separation of 
powers mandated by the Constitution, separation remains sound 
policy because judges are inherently less suited to evaluate military 
decisions than the military and civilian-military personnel.114  The 
court noted that such serious decisions should not be made by the 
“least accountable branch of government.”115 
In outlining the merits of the military-contractor defense, the 
Tozer court strongly dismissed the notion that there would be a dif­
ference in impact on the military if the claim were brought against a 
contractor as opposed to against the military itself.116  The court 
noted that contractors are so intertwined with the military that it is 
virtually impossible to criticize them without simultaneously criti­
cizing, or at least questioning, the military in the same matter.117 
The court then recognized the importance of evaluating military de­
cision making but left such evaluation firmly in the hands of the 
executive and legislative branches, not the courts.118  The court also 
argued that the relationship between the military and its contrac­
tors and the collaborative process of their work requires military 
111. Id. at 405. 
112. Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
113. Id. (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
114. Id. (“The judicial branch contains no Department of Defense or Armed Ser­
vices Committee or other ongoing fund of expertise on which its personnel may 
draw.”); see also In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 
1054 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (“Considerations of cost, time of production, risks to partici­
pants, risks to third parties, and any other factors that might weigh on the decisions of 
whether, when, and how to use a particular weapon, are uniquely questions for the 
military and should be exempt from review by civilian courts.”). 
115. Tozer, 792 F.2d at 405. 
116. Id. at 406. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 406-07. 
391 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-2\WNE204.txt unknown Seq: 19 24-MAY-10 13:53 
2010] IMMUNITY FOR MILITARY SERVICE CONTRACTORS 
contractor immunity both to maintain quality and limit costs.119  On 
the basis of these concerns, the court decided to recognize a mili­
tary version of government-contractor immunity established in 
Yearsley.120 
The Supreme Court would take up the issue of military-
contractor immunity in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. where it 
recognized and established the test for military-contractor immu­
nity for products liability.121 Boyle centered on the death of a 
United States Marine helicopter pilot and the subsequent suit the 
pilot’s father filed against the helicopter manufacturer.122  A pri­
mary focus of the Court’s decision was the tension between the 
wholly federal role of military contractors and the fundamental 
concepts of state tort law.123 Boyle held that federal law can super­
sede state tort law, even without statutory authorization, in cases 
that represent a “uniquely federal interest[ ].”124  Two uniquely fed­
eral interests were presented in Boyle: “obligations to and rights of 
the United States under its contracts”125 and “the civil liability of 
federal officials for actions taken in the course of their duty.”126 
Despite the fact that the suit was nominally against the contractor, 
it was sufficiently related to a contract involving the United States 
to be considered within the first interest.127  As well, the policy 
119. Id. at 407-08; see also McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 450 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (detailing the benefits to the military’s relationship with contractors that a 
contractor immunity would bring). 
120. See Tozer, 792 F.2d at 409. 
121. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512-14 (1988).  For a general 
discussion of Boyle, its rationales and significance, see William C. Buckhold & Lisa D. 
Goekjian, The Government Contractor’s Defense to Products Liability Claims, 99 COM. 
L.J. 64 (1994), and John J. Michels, Jr., The Government Contractor Defense: The Limits 
of Immunity After Boyle, 33 A.F. L. REV. 147 (1990). 
122. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502. 
123. Id. at 504-06. 
124. Id. at 504.  In general, preemption of state law is primarily handled by ex­
plicit language of preemption on the part of Congress.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State 
Energy Res. Conservation, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983).  Preemption is not limited to those 
cases, however.  State law can also be preempted where there is a scheme of federal 
regulation so complete that it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended it not to 
be supplemented by state law. Id. at 204.  Further, state law can be preempted where 
there is federal law on a topic of dominant federal interest or where the Congress 
reveals its intent to preempt otherwise. Id. 
125. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504. 
126. Id. at 505. 
127. Id. at 505-06. 
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goals of the second interest are maintained whether a federal offi­
cial is involved directly or not.128 
Though the Court acknowledged that suits between private 
parties unrelated to the United States are left to state tort law, it 
distinguished Boyle, pointing out that because “[t]he imposition of 
liability on Government contractors will directly affect the terms of 
Government contracts . . . the interests of the United States will be 
directly affected.”129  The Court went on to note the necessity of a 
“significant conflict” to justify the imposition of federal law over 
state tort policies.130  It found this significant conflict in the “discre­
tionary function” exception of the FTCA.131 
The Court also raised the issue of costs, noting that allowing 
contractors to be sued would likely raise the costs of contracting 
with the government.132  The cost of liability would ultimately be 
passed onto the government in its contract pricing.133  This transfer 
of costs creates an inconsistency that the court noted: “It makes 
little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for 
the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is nec­
essary when the Government produces the equipment itself, but not 
when it contracts for the production.”134  This concern—interfer­
ence with the government’s ability to contract—is a major element 
of the Boyle Court’s decision to preempt state tort law.135 
A test ultimately emerged from Boyle that allows for immunity 
from suit for contractors in situations in which (1) the United States 
approved design specifications, (2) the materials produced by a ci­
128. Id. at 505 (“The present case involves an independent contractor performing 
its obligation under a procurement contract, rather than an official performing his duty 
as a federal employee, but there is obviously implicated the same interest in getting the 
Government’s work done.”). 
129. Id. at 507. 
130. Id. at 507-11. 
131. Id. at 511-12.  The discretionary-function exception excludes “[a]ny claim . . . 
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre­
tionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Govern­
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused,” from the broad consent to suit 
established in the FTCA.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). 
132. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 512. 
135. See John Watts, Differences Without Distinctions: Boyle’s Government Con­
tractor Defense Fails to Recognize the Critical Differences Between Civilian and Military 
Plaintiffs and Between Military and Non-Military Procurement, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 647, 
679 (2007) (“The Boyle Court justified the creation of the federal common law defense 
on the need to prevent cost increases . . . and the impermissible interference such costs 
would have on government discretion in procurement.”). 
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vilian contractor met those specifications, and (3) the contractor 
warned the United States about any dangers in the use of the 
materials of which it was aware but the United States was not.136 
The third element of the test, the Court stated, was necessary to 
create disincentives for contractors to withhold information from 
the military about potential dangers.137  In designing this test, the 
Court rejected a test proposed by the Eleventh Circuit,138 which 
would have required either (1) that the contractor not participate 
substantially in the design or (2) that the contractor warn the gov­
ernment and present alternative designs but be told to proceed with 
the original specifications anyway.139 Boyle’s broad use of the dis-
cretionary-function exception has led to inconsistent use of the 
standard, including its use in situations not directly called for in 
Boyle, such as nonmilitary government contracting.140 
The Boyle standard was used in a progressive way by the Elev­
enth Circuit in Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron.141  As a depar­
ture from the typical Boyle fact scenario, Hudgens involved a 
services contract, not a products-procurement contract.142  The neg­
ligence alleged in Hudgens concerned the maintenance of United 
States Army helicopters.143  The Hudgens court held that the true 
thrust of Boyle is not that manufacturers should be protected in 
military-procurement contracts, but rather that state tort law can be 
displaced by the unique federal interest of control over government 
136. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.  The Court’s specific language for the test read,
 
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant
 
to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifica­
tions; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the sup­
plier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment
 
that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.
 
Id. 
137. Id. at 512-13. 
138. See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (11th Cir. 1985). 
139. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513.  The Court did not want to discourage active involve­
ment by the contractor in the design process. See Shaw, 778 F.2d at 746. 
140. See Watts, supra note 135, at 668-69 (“[T]he majority of courts addressing R 
the issue have applied the government contractor defense to non-military contracts. 
These courts have focused upon the broad application of the discretionary function 
exception supporting Boyle and the undesirability of judicial second-guessing of federal 
policy decisions that necessarily occurs in the absence of the defense.” (footnote omit­
ted)).  This arguably overbroad interpretation of the discretionary function was first 
pointed out by the dissent in Boyle, which argued that the FTCA itself was not even 
applicable to the situation and, therefore, one of its exceptions could not be invoked in 
any reasonable way. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 526-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
141. Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). 
142. Id. at 1330. 
143. Id. 
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contracts and protection of the government’s ability to get its work 
done.144  The court decided that the determination of specifications 
for product designs involves the same type of discretion as the deci­
sion of how to maintain a military air fleet, thus justifying the invo­
cation of the discretionary-function exception.145  Based on this 
broad reading, the court held that the Boyle rationale and test 
could be used in the case presented to them, even though it was a 
service contract.146 
For the purpose of the Hudgens analysis, the elements of the 
Boyle test were modified to suit the service contract.147  The court’s 
new test was tailored specifically to the maintenance contractor 
facts and allowed for immunity “if (1) the United States approved 
reasonably precise maintenance procedures; (2) [the contractor’s] 
performance of maintenance conformed to those procedures; and 
(3) [the contractor] warned the United States about the dangers in 
reliance on the procedures that were known to [the contractor] but 
not to the United States.”148  This expansion of products-liability 
immunity to the services context is unique to the Eleventh Circuit 
and has not been followed in any other jurisdiction.149 
144. Id. at 1333-34.  “Although Boyle referred specifically to procurement con­
tracts, the analysis it requires is not designed to promote all-or-nothing rules regarding 
different classes of contract.  Rather, the question is whether subjecting a contractor to 
liability under state tort law would create a significant conflict with a unique federal 
interest.” Id. at 1334. 
145. Id.
 
The formulation of design specifications and the articulation of maintenance
 
protocols involve the exercise of the very same discretion to decide how a
 
military fleet of airworthy craft will be readied.  Holding a contractor liable
 
under state law for conscientiously maintaining military aircraft according to
 
specified procedures would threaten government officials’ discretion in pre­
cisely the same manner as holding contractors liable for departing from design
 
specifications.
 
Id. 
146. Id. at 1333-34. 
147. Id. at 1335-38. 
148. Id. at 1335; see supra note 136. R 
149. See Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615-16 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (dis­
cussing the courts’ hesitance to apply the Boyle test to service contracts and rejecting an 
effort to expand that immunity); see also Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 
WL 2521326, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006) (discussing the limited history of military 
service-contractor immunity); McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 
1315, 1329-31 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (explaining the argument for the application of Boyle 
only to products-procurement contracts), aff’d, 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007). 
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B.	 Claims for Derivative Feres Immunity and Further 
Developments in Military-Contractor Immunity 
The first federal appellate court to hear a case arguing for de­
rivative Feres immunity for military contractors was the Ninth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals in Chapman v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.150 
Chapman involved an on-duty serviceman who was injured when a 
platform collapsed at a government-owned nuclear facility run by 
Westinghouse Corp.151  The court rejected the notion of derivative 
Feres immunity and instead sought to apply the Feres doctrine di­
rectly, which required testing to see if Westinghouse qualified as a 
government employee.152  Because the Feres doctrine only applies 
to suits against the government and its employees, Westinghouse 
would have had to be an employee of the United States for immu­
nity to apply.153  Noting that the government contract clearly de­
fined Westinghouse as a contractor seeking its own profit, the Ninth 
Circuit found the corporation was not a government employee and 
thus held Feres inapplicable.154  The court dismissed the claim for 
Feres-based immunity and instead focused on the Boyle test, based 
in the discretionary-function exception.155  The court noted that 
Boyle had a broader potential reach than Feres because Boyle could 
bar suits against private parties.156  Because the court could not find 
any evidence of precise specifications for the platform, it found the 
Boyle test also to be inapplicable.157 
The various issues of contractor immunity discussed above 
converged in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., in which the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard a claim for derivative 
Feres immunity in a case involving a service contract.158  Presiden­
tial Airways had contracted with the United States to fly military 
150. Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1990); see Mc-
Mahon, 502 F.3d at 1341 n.10.  In seeking derivative immunity, a defendant is attempt­
ing to assert that its relationship to an immune entity (for the purpose of this Note, the 
United States) affords it the immunity of the United States. See Murphy, supra note 
108, at 504-05. R 
151.	 Chapman, 911 F.2d at 268. 
152.	 Id. at 271. 
153.	 Id. 
154.	 Id. 
155.	 Id. at 270-72. 
156.	 Id. at 271. 
157. Id.  This analysis represents an example of the application of Boyle.  The  
court made it through only one prong of the three-part test but did seek to apply the 
Boyle test and looked for precise specifications that would justify immunity. Id. 
158. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1338-57 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
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officers and personnel to and from various locations in the Middle 
East.159  One of its trips unfortunately ended in a crash that proved 
fatal to three United States servicemen.160  The survivors brought 
suit against Presidential Airways on behalf of the deceased soldiers 
in Florida state court, alleging that it had caused the wrongful death 
of the soldiers.161 
Presidential Airways argued that it should be immune under 
the Feres doctrine, but the Eleventh Circuit disagreed.162  Unlike 
Chapman, however, the court did not base its decision on the no­
tion that Feres could not apply to suits against nongovernment enti­
ties.163  Instead, the Eleventh Circuit engaged the concept of 
derivative Feres immunity presented by Presidential Airways.164 
First the court analyzed Presidential Airways’s claim that, as a com­
mon law agent, it was entitled to the government’s sovereign immu­
nity.165  The court never decided whether Presidential Airways was 
a common law agent, but it did disagree with Presidential Airways’s 
position that, if it was, it would be entitled to derivative sovereign 
immunity.166  To the McMahon court, common law agency was not 
dispositive but instead a part of the derivative-immunity analysis.167 
Without deciding the agency question, the court assumed arguendo 
that the airline was a government agent and analyzed Presidential 
Airways’s assertion that it was entitled to some measure of Feres 
immunity.168 
The court then considered the Feres doctrine and found that it 
was simultaneously too broad and too narrow to be applied in the 
claim against Presidential Airways.169  The doctrine was too broad, 
the court held, because it allowed immunity for any injury “incident 
to service,” which would protect contractors from things well 
159. Id. at 1336. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 1356. 
163. Id. at 1338; see Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267, 271 (9th 
Cir. 1990). 
164. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1338. 
165. Id. at 1342-46. 
166. Id. at 1344. 
167. Id. at 1345. 
168. Id. at 1346. 
169. Id. at 1355.  The court’s complaints about Feres were virtually identical to 
those made by the Supreme Court in Boyle: “[I]t seems to us that the Feres doctrine, in 
its application to the present problem, logically produces results that are in some re­
spects too broad and in some respects too narrow.”  Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 
U.S. 500, 510 (1988). 
397 
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outside the policy aims supported by Feres.170  Additionally, the 
doctrine was held to be too narrow in that it only provided immu­
nity from suits by soldiers, not by civilians.171  This paradoxical set 
of weaknesses of the Feres doctrine as applied to the McMahon 
facts would produce absurd results—such as having the claims on 
behalf of the soldiers completely barred regardless of merit—yet 
would allow for claims against Presidential Airways by any nonmili­
tary personnel on board the crashed flight.172  Because of these 
faults in the Feres argument, the court rejected its application.173 
The court did recognize the fact that the third Feres factor, a 
fear of interference and evaluation of sensitive military decisions, 
was applicable to the McMahon facts.174  Despite finding the other 
two factors inapplicable175 and ultimately rejecting Presidential 
Airways’s derivative Feres claims,176 the court found that the value 
of the all-important third factor could merit some level of immunity 
for Presidential Airways.177  The court went on to suggest that this 
standard for immunity would be somewhere between “incident to 
service” and the political-question doctrine.178  It would need to be 
less than “incident to service” for the same reason that the “inci­
dent to service” standard of Feres made that doctrine too broad, 
namely that it would protect contractors from liability in virtually 
all of their actions, regardless of negligence.179  The questions then 
170. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1355; see Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510. 
171. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1355; see Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510. 
172. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1355.  The court presented an example of such an 
absurd result: 
Assume also three people injured by the contractor’s performance of the sen­
sitive military function: a soldier, a civilian employee of the private contractor, 
and a journalist.  If we extended Feres derivatively to the private contractor, 
the soldier could not sue the contractor.  The employee of the private contrac­
tor could sue because, by hypothesis, the suit would not be barred by the polit­
ical question doctrine.  And so could the journalist, for the same reason. 
Id. at 1354. 
173. Id. at 1355. 
174. Id. at 1348-52.  The McMahon court raised the issues of an institutional lack 
of competence in the judiciary to evaluate military decisions and also made a strong 
argument that separation of powers precludes the courts from intruding on military 
decisions left to the two political branches. Id. at 1349-50. 
175. Id. at 1346-47. 
176. Id. at 1356. 
177. Id. at 1351 (“We thus acknowledge that private contractor agents may be 
entitled to some form of immunity that protects their making or executing sensitive 
military judgments, and that overlaps and possibly extends beyond the protection pro­
vided by the political question doctrine.”). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-2\WNE204.txt unknown Seq: 26 24-MAY-10 13:53 
398 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:373 
posed by the court were whether the political-question doctrine was 
too narrow and whether there were instances in which Presidential 
Airways could merit immunity while at the same time not requiring 
the court to directly consider a political question.180  Ultimately, the 
court did not answer these questions and instead left them merely 
as suggestions.181 
V. THE BOYLE TEST SHOULD BE APPLIED TO
 
SERVICE CONTRACTORS
 
Civilian companies who contract to provide services to the 
United States military should receive immunity from civil liability 
in cases where they have acted in compliance with specific direc­
tions of the United States military.  This immunity is necessary for 
two reasons.  First, it is necessary to protect the discretion of the 
United States in its military contracts, discretion that would be 
threatened by contract liability for actions performed by a contrac­
tor under the direction of the United States.  Second, a service-
contractor immunity is necessary to maintain the internal discipline 
of the United States military, which could be threatened if regular 
tort analysis was applied to the orders and directions given to mili­
tary contractors. 
This Note will analyze the Feres doctrine and will argue that 
Feres is structurally inappropriate for application in these scenarios. 
Then this Note will consider the political-question doctrine and will 
argue that it does not provide broad and consistent enough cover­
age to meet all of the potential scenarios.  Finally, the Note will 
argue that a modified version of the Boyle test represents the most 
balanced, fair, and consistent way to provide the necessary immu­
nity for military service contractors.  This test would grant immu­
nity to contractors in any case where (1) the United States military 
180. Id.  For a description and analysis of the political-question doctrine by the 
Supreme Court, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).  The Court placed a large 
amount of emphasis on the separation of powers, stating that “[t]he nonjusticiability of 
a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.” Id.  The politi­
cal-question doctrine, in general, prevents courts from hearing claims that present is­
sues committed to another branch of the government. See Morgan McCue Sport, An 
Inconvenient Suit: California v. General Motors Corporation and a Look at Whether 
Global Warming Constitutes an Actionable Public Nuisance or a Nonjusticiable Political 
Question, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 583, 619-21 (2008).  The basis of the American political-
question doctrine lies, like many jurisprudential concepts, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).  There, the Court stated that “[q]uestions, in their 
nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, 
can never be made in this court.” Id. 
181. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1355-56. 
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had given a contractor a reasonably specific outline of their contrac­
tual duties, (2) the contractor had performed its duties satisfacto­
rily, and (3) the contractor had apprised the United States of any 
risks or dangers it knew of concerning its contractual duties. 
Through this test, immunity would be fairly invoked in cases where 
contractors caused injuries or damages merely through following 
the orders given to them by the United States military. 
A.	 Military Service Contractors Should Receive Some Level of 
Immunity 
Military service contractors should receive some level of immu­
nity because the same concerns that substantiate immunity in mili­
tary products-procurement situations exist in the service-contractor 
sector as well.  The same concern exists for allowing the govern­
ment to get its work done and have discretion in determining its 
contracts.  There also exists the concern that military discipline is 
threatened by litigation over military contracts. 
1. The Threat to Military Discipline 
While the concern for military discipline was not even an ele­
ment of the Feres decision, it has undoubtedly become the most 
substantial of the Feres factors.182  The potential exists in suits 
brought against military service contractors to significantly impact 
military discipline.183  These suits would be brought against contrac­
tors whose actions were dictated at least in part by the terms of 
their government contract.184  Because of this contractual obliga­
182. See Seidelson, supra note 20, at 226-30 (discussing the evolving changes to R 
the discipline rationale, beginning with its absence in Feres, and continuing until it be­
came the controlling rationale in Shearer); see also Astley, supra note 20, at 217-19 R 
(discussing the Court’s use in Johnson of the other nondiscipline Feres factors, despite 
having been rendered noncontrolling in earlier decisions). 
183. See Seidelson, supra note 20, at 229-30 (explaining how the entire rationale R 
of Feres becomes “[j]udicial second-guessing of military acts and decisions [that] would 
have an adverse effect on military discipline”).  It is important for this discussion of the 
military-discipline factor to see that it is no longer truly about the conflict between 
officers and their subordinates but has evolved into something else—a question of the 
impacts of judicial interference into the military’s decision-making process. See United 
States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 681-91 (1987). 
184. See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1986).  In Tozer, the 
court noted within the context of products-procurement contracts that the contractors 
and the military work “so closely” together that to criticize the contractor inherently 
criticizes the military. Id.  This situation repeats itself in service contracts where the 
government and the contractors work together to build a set of parameters for the 
performance of the service, much as the military works with its products contractors to 
come up with a design for a product.  If a court were to criticize a plan executed by a 
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tion, a claim against the contractor could very likely require the 
court to make qualitative assessments of protocols and procedures 
determined by the United States military and its officers.  It does 
not matter that the claim is not brought against the military and 
that there is no allegation of negligence against the military, since 
“a suit based upon service-related activity necessarily implicates the 
military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined 
with the conduct of the military mission.”185  Thus, a suit brought 
against a military contractor could likely result in the court analyz­
ing and criticizing the decisions of the United States military. 
Courts have neither the competence nor the constitutional 
power to judge decisions made by the military.  Courts are not com­
petent to analyze the decisions of the military because they lack the 
expertise necessary to formulate a standard of care to determine 
whether the decisions of the military adequately balance interests in 
safety and effectiveness.186  A court simply could not establish a 
competent standard of care for how well the military balances all of 
its considerations when it makes a decision.187  As well, for the 
court to consider these military decisions would violate the separa­
tion of powers doctrine, since oversight of military decisions is ex­
clusively left to the legislative and the executive branches by the 
Constitution.188  This logic applies with equal strength to the mili­
military contractor, it would implicate the military just as much as the contractor. Id.; 
see also McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1336 (military retained control over what flights would 
be flown, where to, and with who onboard); Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 
F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 2003) (military controlled the frequency and thoroughness of 
maintenance inspections on helicopters). 
185. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691.  The Johnson Court pointed out that judicial analy­
sis of civilian activities can be just as potent an attack on military discipline as a direct 
analysis of the military judgment itself. Id. at 691 n.11; see also Stencel Aero Eng’g 
Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977) (holding that the impact on military 
decision making will not depend on the target of the suit—the military contractor or the 
military itself—as it would “in either case, involve second-guessing military orders”). 
186. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1350.  The Eleventh Circuit in McMahon quoted 
from Gilligan v. Morgan, which stated, “[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of govern­
mental activity in which the courts have less competence.  The complex subtle, and 
professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a mili­
tary force are essentially professional military judgments . . . .”  Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 
U.S. 1, 10 (1973). 
187. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1350 (“Where sensitive military judgments are in­
volved, courts lack the capacity to determine the proper tradeoff between military ef­
fectiveness and the risk of harm to the soldiers.”). 
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2; see United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 
669, 682 (1987) (noting “the insistence (evident from the number of Clauses devoted to 
the subject) with which the Constitution confers authority over the Army, Navy, and 
militia upon the political branches”); McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1350-51. 
401 
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tary’s use of contractors.  It would violate separation of powers for 
the court to interfere with military plans executed by military con­
tractors, since the decisions still belong to the military regardless of 
who brings them to completion.189  The Supreme Court has held 
that these concerns for military decision making justify a doctrine of 
immunity in various circumstances.190 
Military service contractors are entitled to some level of immu­
nity in situations where judicial attempts to determine contractor 
liability would require the court to stick its nose into the military 
decision-making process.  For example, the court would be called 
on to entertain questions over what would be a safe flight plan for a 
military contractor transporting soldiers, what are appropriate 
safety protocols for bodyguards protecting important persons visit­
ing Iraq, or what are reasonable schedules of contracted mainte­
nance for military aircraft.  Even if a court could fairly assess a 
negligence claim in such specialized contexts, the very process of 
doing so would interfere in military decision making and violate the 
separation of powers.191 
189.	 McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1350-51.  The court stated, 
It would similarly violate separation of powers for the courts to interfere 
with sensitive military judgments made or executed by private contractor 
agents of the military.  The military has the constitutionally exclusive authority 
to make those kinds of judgments, and judicial oversight of the private con­
tractor agents the military uses to execute those judgments would likewise vio­
late separation of powers principles. 
Id.; see Harry A. Austin, Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation: A Questionable 
Expansion of the Government Contract Defense, 23 GA. L. REV. 227, 235 (1988) (“Sev­
eral courts have relied upon the [separation of powers] doctrine as a sufficient justifica­
tion for the adoption of the government contract defense.”). 
190. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-13 (1988) (using the 
concern for military decision making as a supporting rationale for its creation of an 
immunity standard for military-products contractors); Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682-83 (hold­
ing that merely entertaining the questions—even if they could obtain the right an-
swers—would disrupt military decision making, precluding a case-by-case analysis of 
military-discipline interference); Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691-92 (using the military-
discipline question as part of the Feres-factor analysis); United States v. Shearer, 473 
U.S. 52, 57-59 (1985) (holding that the discipline and decision-making factor was the 
sole factor left justifying and substantiating the Feres doctrine); Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. 
at 673 (holding that the discipline-and-decision-making factor applied just as strongly in 
cases against contractors as in cases against the military); United States v. Brown, 348 
U.S. 110, 143-44 (1954) (introducing the concerns for military discipline into the Feres­
doctrine discussion); Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
the concern for military decision making and separation of powers substantiated an 
immunity for a military contractor). 
191. See, e.g., Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683 (“[T]he mere process of arriving at correct 
conclusions would disrupt the military regime.”). 
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2.	 The Discretionary-Function Exemption to the FTCA and 
the Boyle Analysis 
The impropriety of judicial intrusion into military decision 
making is further demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s treatment 
of the discretionary-function exemption to the FTCA.192  In Boyle, 
the Court used the discretionary-function exemption of the FTCA 
as the main rationale for the military-contractor immunity it estab­
lished.193  This same rationale is used in the service-contractor con­
text, where the chance for interference with discretionary military 
decisions is equally present.194  To justify its use of the discretion-
ary-function exemption as the basis of an immunity standard, the 
Court stated that the “[selection of designs] often involves not 
merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of 
many technical, military, and even social considerations, including 
specifically the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat 
effectiveness.”195  All of these considerations can and do apply for 
service contracts.  The military, in deciding the parameters within 
which its service contractors will work, must balance safety, effec­
192. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (“And we are further of the view that permitting 
‘second-guessing’ of these judgments . . . through state tort suits against contractors 
would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption.” (cita­
tions omitted)). 
193. Id. at 510-12; see Watts, supra note 135, at 649-50, 655-58 (describing the R 
Court’s concern that the costs of liability would ultimately be transferred to the United 
States and would thus infringe on its powers to make discretionary decisions affecting 
social, economic, or political policy). 
194. Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2003). 
The court stated, 
Although Boyle referred specifically to procurement contracts, the analy­
sis it requires is not designed to promote all-or-nothing rules regarding differ­
ent classes of contract. . . . We would be exceedingly hard-pressed to conclude
 
that the unique federal interest recognized in Boyle . . . [is] not likewise mani­
fest in the present case.  The formulation of design specifications and the artic­
ulation of maintenance protocols involve the exercise of the very same
 
discretion to decide how a military fleet of airworthy craft will be readied.
 
Holding a contractor liable under state law for conscientiously maintaining mili­
tary aircraft according to specified procedures would threaten government offi­
cials’ discretion in precisely the same manner as holding contractors liable for
 
departing from design specifications.
 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
195. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.  The Court went on to discuss how the liability of the 
contractor would be paid in the contract fees of the United States and thus represented 
a nonsensical position, whereby the United States would be shielded from financial 
liability when it made its own products but not when it ordered the products from a 
military contractor. Id. at 512.  This same idea applies to service contracts, whereby the 
cost of litigation would be passed on to the United States government.  This reality 
carries just as much sense as the situation the Court identified in Boyle. See id. 
403 
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tiveness, cost, and many other factors within a context that is 
unique to the military and quite different from that of state tort law. 
For the purpose of this Note’s analysis, it is best to take the 
Boyle analysis step-by-step and analogize it to military service con­
tracts.  The Boyle analysis requires that, to preempt state law con­
cerns, the competing concern must be a “unique[ ] federal 
interest[ ].”196  In Boyle, the court found that the government’s ob­
ligations and responsibilities in forming and satisfying contracts to 
be a uniquely federal interest.197  This unique federal interest also 
exists in performance or service contracts.  Based on the extensive 
history of federal case law recognized in Boyle and Hudgens, the 
terms and management of service contracts by the United States 
military is a uniquely federal interest.198 
The second unique federal interest found in Boyle is a desire 
for “getting the Government’s work done.”199  While this typically 
comes in the form of limiting the liability of federal officials con­
ducting their duties, at its heart it is an interest in allowing the 
United States to conduct all of its various functions free from the 
encumbrances of excessive liability.200  The Boyle Court did not 
find a meaningful distinction between an independent contractor 
performing his obligations for the military and a federal official per­
196. Id. at 504; see Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? 
Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 496 n.243 (2007) (describing Supreme Court 
case law on “[u]nique federal interests”). 
197. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504-05; see Wendy B. Davis, De Facto Merger, Federal 
Common Law, and Erie: Constitutional Issues in Successor Liability, 2008 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 529, 591 (2008) (“The Court [in Boyle] found a uniquely federal interest in 
limiting the liability of military contractors.”). 
198. See Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1334; see also Ben Davidson, Note, Liability on the 
Battlefield: Adjudicating Tort Suits Brought by Soldiers Against Military Contractors, 37 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 803, 827 (2008) (“[T]he Boyle Court’s use of the FTCA discretionary 
function exception to cabin the uniquely federal interest of procuring military equip­
ment could just as easily apply when the Government buys nonmilitary products or 
services.”). 
199. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505; see David E. Seidelson, Federal Common Law: 
Whose Baby Are You?, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 365, 368-69 (1996). 
200. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505-06.  The Court admitted that this interest had been 
specifically stated as one concerning the liability of federal officials. Id.; see, e.g., How­
ard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959) (holding that an interest in overseeing the actions 
of federal officials is uniquely federal in nature); see also Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen 
Gutman, “Federal Common Law” in the European Union: A Comparative Perspective 
from the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 98-100 (2006) (explaining the Court’s 
rationale in linking the Boyle facts to contractual obligations and limiting the scope of 
federal official liability, issues which the private contractor scenario did not directly 
represent but which it indirectly touched). 
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forming his duties as they relate to getting the job done.201 
Whether it is for a military procurement contract or a military ser­
vices contract, both involve private contractors carrying out a con­
tractual obligation to the United States military in the furtherance 
of military goals.202  Under the Boyle analysis, there are unique fed­
eral interests implicated by the application of state tort law to 
claims arising out of injuries caused by military service contractors. 
To justify preemption of state tort law, it is not enough that 
there are substantial federal interests involved.  There must also be 
significant conflict between those interests and the application of 
state law.203  It is at this stage of the analysis that the discretionary-
function exemption comes into play.204  The discretionary-function 
exemption, as part of a federal statute, is a textual expression of 
federal policy.205  The policy embodied in that exemption comes 
into conflict with state law when claims arise that call on courts to 
assess, and potentially interfere with, discretionary decisions made 
by the United States government.206  As demonstrated in Boyle, in 
the products-procurement context, the statutory goal of protecting 
government officials who make discretionary decisions conflicts 
with the application of state law, which must therefore be 
preempted. 
201. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505 (“The present case involves an independent contrac­
tor performing its obligation under a procurement contract, rather than an official per­
forming his duty as a federal employee, but there is obviously implicated the same 
interest in getting the Government’s work done.”). 
202. Id. at 506.  The Court stated that “[t]he federal interest justifying this hold­
ing surely exists as much in procurement contracts as in performance contracts; we see 
no basis for distinction.” Id.  The Court stated this in reference to Yearsley v. W.A. 
Construction Co. and the established history of federal law preempting state law for 
civilian government service or performance contracts. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Con­
str. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940).  The interpretation here should thus be the same for 
military service contracts, which clearly must represent a unique federal interest. See 
Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1334. 
203. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (“That the procurement of equipment by the United 
States is an area of uniquely federal interest does not, however, end the inquiry.  That 
merely establishes a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the displacement of state 
law.”); see Roger Doyle, Comment, Contract Torture: Will Boyle Allow Private Military 
Contractors to Profit from the Abuse of Prisoners?, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. 
& DEV. L.J. 467, 479 (2007) (“However, simply finding a unique federal interest does 
not inevitably result in the displacement of state law.  Displacement will only occur 
where a significant conflict exists between an identifiable unique federal interest and 
the operation of state law.” (citation omitted)). 
204. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. 
205. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). 
206. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. 
405 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-2\WNE204.txt unknown Seq: 33 24-MAY-10 13:53 
2010] IMMUNITY FOR MILITARY SERVICE CONTRACTORS 
Establishing a judicial basis for preemption of state-law tort 
suits against military contractors may appear to be an abstract un­
dertaking.  Behind this undertaking, however, is a very real con-
cern—the lost opportunity for citizens of the United States to be 
compensated for injuries they suffer in interactions with a military 
contractor.  The immunity doctrine proposed by this Note would 
require not only an individualized loss of compensation but also the 
complete disregard of a bedrock principle of the American legal 
tradition—that people are entitled to be compensated for injuries 
they suffer—for an entire category of claims.207  There is, however, 
an established line of Supreme Court precedent that supports deny­
ing plaintiffs their day in court, especially within the context of pro­
tecting military interests. 
Perhaps the most notable example of the Court’s willingness to 
deny relief in such circumstances is United States v. Stanley.208  Re­
call that Master Sergeant James B. Stanley, a member of the United 
States Army, was secretly administered LSD as part of an official 
army plan to test the effects of the drug.209  Because of this testing, 
Stanley suffered an extensive list of problems that ultimately ruined 
his post-service life.210  If any claim deserves redress and compensa­
tion, it would be a claim such as Stanley’s.211  Instead, the Court 
207. See Ronen Perry, The Economic Bias in Tort Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1573, 1610 (2008) (“One may argue that any attempt to challenge the principle of full 
compensation for harm caused by wrongful conduct defies the basic structure of tort 
law.”). 
208. 483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
209. Id. at 671. 
210. Id.  Stanley suffered from hallucinations, memory loss, and personality 
changes that impaired his work performance and ultimately resulted in the end of his 
marriage. Id. 
211. In fact, the opinion by Justice O’Connor suggests that it must be compen­
sated, raising comparisons to the medical testing by Nazi officials during the Second 
World War. See id. at 709-10 (O’Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).  After restating 
the standard that there must be consent by the test subjects, Justice O’Connor stated, 
“If this principle is violated the very least that society can do is to see the victims are 
compensated, as best they can be, by the perpetrators.” Id. at 710.  Justice Brennan 
also delivered a sharply worded opinion: “[T]he Court disregards the commands of our 
Constitution, and bows instead to the purported requirements of a different master, 
military discipline, declining to provide Stanley with a remedy because it finds ‘special 
factors counseling hesitation.’” Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 396 (1971)).  Justice Brennan went on to state that “[t]he subject of experimenta­
tion who has not volunteered is treated as an object, a sample.  James Stanley will re­
ceive no compensation for this indignity.” Id. at 707.  The words of Justices Brennan 
and O’Connor accurately frame the severity of the offense against Stanley. 
The decision of the Court went against Stanley based on “military discipline,” as 
Justice Brennan noted. Id. at 686.  Perhaps even more frustrating to Justice Brennan 
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rejected Stanley’s arguments and denied him a remedy.212  The Su­
preme Court showed itself willing to reject the compensation for a 
heinous, blatant, and intentional tort in order to protect the govern­
ment interests under examination in this Note. 
Stanley was not the first time the Court had shown such an 
inclination to protect government interests over the right of individ­
uals to obtain redress in court.213 Boyle also demonstrated the 
Court’s willingness to see individuals go uncompensated where it 
deems such an outcome necessary to protect the United States’s 
control over the terms of military contracts and judgment regarding 
the appropriate trade-offs between safety, efficiency, and various 
other concerns.214  Cases like Boyle and Stanley show that the 
Court is willing to put aside the basic principles of redress for injury 
that form the core of American tort law in cases where that law 
substantially conflicts with a uniquely federal interest.215  It is estab­
lished that the interest in getting the government’s work done and 
protecting the ability of the military to enter into and perform con­
tracts is sufficient to displace state tort concerns in products-
procurement situations.216  Thus, no logical reason exists to deny a 
similar outcome in situations involving military service contracts. 
B. How Much Immunity Is Necessary? 
Military contractors should be entitled to a standard of immu­
nity, modified from the Boyle standard, in cases where the contrac­
tor followed specified terms set by the United States military and 
was that it could not even be shown concretely how military discipline was implicated in 
the case; it was a “talismanic invocation” of the military-discipline concern. Id. at 708. 
While Justice Brennan’s words are biting and persuasive, the real force of the Stanley 
decision comes in the recognition of just how far the Court is willing to go to protect the 
interests of the military. 
212. Id. at 686 (majority opinion). 
213. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 22 (1940) (holding that a 
civilian claim could not be brought against a government contractor acting within the 
bounds of its constitutional assignment by the United States government). 
214. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).  In creating its 
limited immunity standard, the Court accepted that certain injuries would not be com­
pensated.  On remand, judgment for the defendants was ordered because United Tech­
nologies satisfied the elements of the government-contractor defense.  Boyle v. United 
Techs. Corp., No. 85-2264, 1988 WL 96122, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 1988) (per curiam). 
Thus, the decision in Boyle explicitly paved the way for a wrongful death claim to go 
uncompensated. 
215. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a settled 
and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and 
every injury its proper redress.”). 
216. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. 
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fulfilled them satisfactorily.  The alternatives are not sufficient.  The 
Feres doctrine is inappropriate because it is too broad (shielding 
from liability for any injury suffered incident to service, thus even in 
cases of simple incompetent execution on the part of the contrac­
tor) and too narrow (shielding only from claims by soldiers and not 
from civilians, thus leaving the contractor potentially liable for mis­
takes originating in government plans given to the contractor).217 
The political-question doctrine, because of its inconsistent applica­
tion, is also not a sufficient standard. Boyle presents the most bal­
anced and fair approach because it can be applied evenly to select 
out those cases that threaten the military interests the Court wishes 
to protect, regardless of who is bringing the claim or what type of 
claim it is. 
1. The Feres Doctrine Is an Inappropriate Standard 
Despite the relevance of military-discipline concerns to cases 
involving military service contractors, the analytic structure of the 
Feres doctrine itself is not well-suited for the type of immunity doc­
trine such cases demand.  There are two main reasons for this con­
clusion.  First, the Feres doctrine’s incident-to-service test is far too 
broad.218  Any type of modified incident-to-service test would im­
munize service contractors from virtually all liability.219  Such a so­
217. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text. R 
218. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510 (“[I]t seems to us that the Feres doctrine . . . 
logically produces results that are . . . too broad . . . .”); McMahon v. Presidential Air­
ways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1351 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We think it quite clear that the inci­
dent-to-service test sweeps far too broadly to protect this concern.  Some suits barred 
by the incident-to-service test simply do not involve sensitive military judgments that 
courts lack the competence or authority to deal with.”). 
219. See R. Craig Anderson & John. M. Pellett, Personal Civil Liability for Fed­
eral Employees and Their Representation by the Department of Justice in the Aftermath 
of the Westfall Legislation—An Introduction for the Base Judge Advocate, 33 A.F. L. 
REV. 19, 28 (1990) (“The scope of injuries incident to service and thus barred by the 
Feres doctrine is broad enough to encompass virtually any injury for which a plaintiff 
might seek to sue a federal official individually.” (alteration to original)); see also Rob­
ert J. Gross, Special Considerations in Military Flying Club Litigation, 59 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 561, 577-78 (1994) (“‘[I]ncident to service’ is not a narrow term restricted to mili­
tary training, field maneuvers, or combat situations; rather it is a broad concept encom­
passing all types of recreational activities, even though the military member is not 
acting pursuant to orders or subject to direct military command or discipline.”). 
If an incident-to-service standard were used as the main test for immunity for ser­
vice contractors, it would immunize contractors from liability for their own blatant neg­
ligence.  Imagine, for example, that a contracted helicopter mechanic forgot to 
complete a portion of a scheduled check mandated by the government by the terms of 
the maintenance contract.  A pilot of the United States Navy then flies the vehicle.  It 
crashes, and he is injured.  Based on a modified incident-to-service test, the injured 
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lution is not fair, nor is it justified by concerns for military discipline 
or the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. 
Additionally, the Feres doctrine’s incident-to-service test is too 
narrow because it would only protect contractors from suits by 
soldiers.220  While many of the suits brought against military con­
tractors would be brought by soldiers, the fact that civilian contrac­
tors now make up more than half of the manpower on the ground 
in Iraq shows the potential that exists for military contractors to be 
sued by one of the tens of thousands of other contractors on the 
ground with them or any other civilian.221  A test that covers only a 
subset of the population that could potentially bring suit, and cov­
ers that subset to an excessive degree, does not represent a reasona­
ble standard.222  So, while the concern for military discipline that 
pilot would have no claim against the contractor.  This would not be a fair or justifiable 
result since there is little or no recognizable benefit to military discipline or any preser­
vation of discretionary functions if a contractor is immunized from liability for its own 
negligence.  The only interest served in such a case would be that of the contractor. 
Such an interest does not justify displacing the basic right of compensation for those 
injured by contractor’s negligence. See McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1351 (“For example, 
where a private contractor agent is running a mess hall on a peacetime base, and a 
soldier gets food poisoning attributable to the contractor’s negligence, the suit would be 
barred under the ‘incident to service’ test.”). 
220. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510-11.  “[R]eliance on Feres produces (or logically 
should produce) results that are in another respect too narrow.” Id. at 510.  The Court 
found the Feres doctrine inapplicable for the contractor scenario because it would not 
protect the government interests in cases where civilians were injured because of an 
interaction with a government contractor. Id.  The Court provides the following 
example: 
Since that doctrine covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries caused
 
by the military to civilians, it could not be invoked to prevent, for example, a
 
civilian’s suit against the manufacturer of fighter planes, based on a state tort
 
theory, claiming harm from what is alleged to be needlessly high levels of
 
noise produced by the jet engines.  Yet we think that the character of the jet
 
engines the Government orders for its fighter planes cannot be regulated by
 
state tort law, no more in suits by civilians than in suits by members of the
 
Armed Services.
 
Id. at 510-11; see also McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1355 (holding that an application of Feres 
to a service contractor “would be too narrow because it would only protect against suits 
implicating sensitive military judgments that are brought by soldiers, and not against 
those brought by civilians, or even employees of the private contractor itself”). 
221. See supra note 25. R 
222. See McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1354.  The court presented a scenario where three 
individuals are injured in conjunction with some act by a military contractor. Id.  One is 
a soldier, one a civilian employee of the contractor, and the other is a journalist. Id.  In 
such a case, both the journalist and the contractor’s employee could sue while the sol­
dier could not. Id.  The court determined that “[t]here is simply no principled reason 
why this result should obtain.” Id.  In a similar example presented by the court, it 
pointed out that suits brought by the employees would not be barred, “[y]et they would 
present the very same threat of subjecting sensitive military judgments to second-guess­
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has come to dominate Feres claims is certainly present, the incident­
to-service test at the core of the Feres doctrine simply cannot be the 
standard for immunity for military service contractors. 
2. The Political-Question Doctrine Is Not Sufficient 
Nor is the existing political-question doctrine sufficient to pro­
tect the interests implicated by military service contractor liability. 
The doctrine lacks the type of consistent, clear, and specific applica­
tion necessary to guarantee protection of military interests.223  The 
situation does not call for a prudentially applied immunity left to 
the case-by-case whims of any particular judge but rather a predict­
able and consistent standard where the question of immunity would 
be resolved beforehand by referencing specific criteria set forth in 
the test. 
While the rationale of the political-question doctrine coincides 
in some places with this Note’s proposed test,224 there are likely to 
be many instances where the doctrine would be inapplicable yet 
where a Boyle-type test would still provide a fair and necessary im­
munity to a military contractor.  An example would be where a mil­
itary policy led to an injury and the military subsequently—but 
before litigation—changed its policy.225  In such a case, there would 
be no worries of confusing and differing positions espoused by the 
different branches of government.  Removed from the incident and 
ing by a court.” Id.  Thus, the results are neither fair nor effective.  The military’s abil­
ity to do its work without interference is not protected, and soldiers are specifically 
singled out to not be allowed to recover for their injuries in situations where civilians 
can. Id. 
223. See Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: 
The Other Nixon v. United States, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 152-54 (1993) (discussing 
the inconsistent application of the political-question doctrine, stating that “[t]he result is 
a political-question ‘doctrine’ that is mixed up and inconsistent with its own purposes”); 
Melissa Blair, Comment, Terrorism, America’s Porous Borders, and the Role of the In­
vasion Clause Post-9/11/2001, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 167, 200-02 (2003) (discussing the “ju­
risprudential chaos” of the Court’s application of the political-question doctrine to 
claims raising questions of foreign relations).  This “jurisprudential chaos” would not be 
helpful in the quagmire of Iraq war litigation.  A clear, specific rule is needed, not 
merely a reliance on a nebulous and inconsistently applied standard. 
224. See Davidson, supra note 198, at 805-06, 822-27.  Davidson argues that the R 
Boyle test and the political-question doctrine are different versions of the same concept. 
Id. Boyle represents a more specific application of the political-question doctrine; how­
ever, the political-question doctrine has been used as an imprecise application of Boyle 
in situations where the text of the Boyle test does not directly relate, such as military 
service contractors. Id. 
225. This was the case in Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, where the military 
changed its maintenance policy after the incident. See Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/ 
Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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after the military had already changed its policy, a court would be 
less likely to apply the political-question doctrine.  What would re­
main, however, would be the need to protect the discretionary deci­
sions of the United States and its military.  Allowing litigation to 
move forward in such cases would expose the contractors to liability 
where they fulfilled their duties as requested by the military. 
As the Court noted in Boyle, the cost of litigation for the con­
tractor would be passed on to the United States in its contracts and 
would influence the ability of the government to contract in the fu­
ture.226  By eliminating this fear of litigation, the costs of the United 
States’s military contracts would be reduced, and more contractors 
may be willing to enter into business with the United States know­
ing that they would be immunized from some of the unfortunate 
things that happen in military theaters.  Allowing the litigation to 
go forward, on the other hand, would inevitably mean the costs of 
litigation would be passed on to the United States.  Additionally, 
fear of liability for government decisions could potentially discour­
age contractors from doing business with the United States military 
and thus infringe on the United States’s ability to contract.  Because 
of these issues, the political-question doctrine is not a complete or 
reliable standard.  It is too nebulous to fairly and predictably grant 
immunity to military contractors. 
3. A Modification of Boyle Presents the Best Standard 
The test used in Boyle provides the most effective and fair 
standard to use for military contractors.  It shields contractors from 
liability in cases where the principle cause of the injury is not any 
individualized negligence but instead springs from some larger deci­
sion made by the United States military.  A modification of this 
three-part test represents the best route to an immunity standard 
for service contractors.227 
226. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1988). 
227. See Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1333.  In Hudgens, the Eleventh Circuit applied a 
modified version of the Boyle standard to a claim brought against a service contractor 
who had been responsible for maintenance on a helicopter that crashed. Id. at 1334-38. 
The court took the Boyle test prong by prong and modified the language to specifically 
suit Hudgens’s contract with the United States military. Id.  The court did not consider 
or criticize the United States military’s decision to maintain its own standards for the 
maintenance of its vehicles. Id.  The court left the military’s decisions regarding how to 
appropriately balance safety and efficiency to be reviewed by those with the compe­
tency and authority to do so. Id.  As well, DynCorp, the maintenance contractor, was 
not held liable for its maintenance performance which met the standards and require­
ments the United States military set on it. Id. at 1345.  While Hudgens represents an 
411 
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The first prong of the test is that the contractor had a reasona­
bly specific outline of its contractual duties.  This flows from the 
first prong of Boyle’s test, which requires that “the United States 
approve[ ] reasonably precise specifications.”228  This factor guaran­
tees that the military has actually been involved in the decision-
making process by giving the contractor a reasonably precise set of 
requirements and parameters for its contractual duties.229  Within 
each individual type of service, the nature of these specifications 
would be different.  For contracted airlines, it could be military con­
trol over flight plans, passenger lists, and other things that lead to 
very specific parameters within which to conduct each flight.230  For 
a maintenance contractor, it could be the protocols the military had 
established for the frequency and thoroughness of inspection and 
repair.231  For a private security contractor, it could be protocols 
covering the use of force or a host of other details.  While the re­
quirement might not be satisfied in exactly the same way for any 
two contractors, this standard is flexible enough to only provide im­
munity for contractors whose duties were discretionally decided by 
the United States military. 
The key in any type of service contract would be that the 
guidelines provided by the government “constitute[d] a comprehen­
sive regime that [the contractor] was not expected to supplement 
through any procedures other than those specifically set forth.”232 
Each attempt to establish this immunity would thus require con­
tractors to show that the course of their actions was determined by 
a “comprehensive regime.”233  Contractors who were not given spe­
individual example of the application of the Boyle immunity test to service contractors, 
it is also a case tailored to a set of facts.  The modifications made to the Boyle test serve 
to test maintenance contractors and DynCorp specifically.  What is necessary is a uni­
versal test, inspired by Boyle, for service contractors.  This requires broader language 
that is applicable to a host of types of contractors.  This type of test would preserve the 
same interests as Boyle and offer the same type of limited and fair protection to con­
tractors, just for a different type of contract. 
228. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. 
229. Id. (stating that the factor “assure[s] that the suit is within the area where the 
policy of the ‘discretionary function’ would be frustrated—i.e., they assure that the de­
sign feature in question was considered by a Government officer, and not merely by the 
contractor itself”). 
230. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1336 (11th Cir. 
2007) (detailing the statement of work for an airline contractor). 
231. See Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1335.  In Hudgens, the Army’s maintenance guide­
lines controlled DynCorp’s actions and the court ruled that those guidelines constituted 
something equivalent to Boyle’s reasonably specific design requirement. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
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cific parameters for their actions and who were given broader dis­
cretion in determining how their duties would be carried out would 
not be protected in this immunity standard.  Without the existence 
of specified protocols mandated by the military, there are no perti­
nent discretionary decisions made by the government which the 
court must protect.234  An example of this came in the application 
of Boyle in Chapman, where the court did not find evidence of any 
precise specifications and thus found the Boyle test inapplicable.235 
The second prong of the test requires that the contractor com­
pleted its duties according to the standard required by the specific 
governmental regime or protocol.  This prong comes from the 
Boyle test’s requirement that the final product met government 
specifications.236  This requirement is necessary to definitively con­
nect the injury at issue to a discretionary decision made by the mili­
tary and would preclude immunity in situations in which the 
contractor either did not complete its duties or did so negligently.237 
Contractors who negligently perform their obligations should not 
be protected from liability simply because they have a contract with 
the government.  Furthermore, because the military’s discretionary 
decision would be too far removed from claims involving contractor 
negligence, such claims would not be covered by the policy ratio­
234. It is possible that in some of these cases, considering a claim against a con­
tractor that was left to its own devices by the military in the nebulous and oftentimes 
uncharted territory of postwar occupation—all while being compensated by piles of 
taxpayer dollars—would embarrass the military and perhaps interfere with it accom­
plishing its goals.  These situations would not fit within a Boyle-like standard of immu­
nity for military service contractors and are not argued for in this Note.  The political-
question doctrine and the state-secrets privilege exist outside of any immunity standard 
for service contractors and can be invoked when warranted in such cases to protect 
their own concerned interests. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1973) (noting 
political-question doctrine); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (noting 
state-secrets privilege).  The immunity standard argued for in this Note explicitly con­
siders only those whose duties were specified to a reasonable degree by the United 
States and who followed through satisfactorily on those requirements, even if they later 
proved insufficient or damaging.  A defining rule—such as the one presented in this 
Note—which clearly separates those contractors entitled to immunity from those not 
entitled to immunity could perhaps go a long way towards clearing up the legal 
minefield and tasking contractors with mindfulness of their own negligence. 
235. Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Without the precise specifications of the government, there is really no discretionary 
function being protected.  If immunity were afforded in such a situation, the negligence 
of the contractor would be shielded, not the decisions of the United States.  This would 
not produce fair or logical results. 
236. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). 
237. Id. at 512-13.  The Court also attributed the second element of the test to 
limiting the test to claims that would raise the discretionary-decision issue. Id. 
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nales underlying the discretionary-function exemption.238  In at­
tempting to establish the immunity, the contractor would have to 
show that its performance complied with its government 
instructions.239 
The third prong of the test requires that the contractor disclose 
to the United States any knowledge of risks or dangers that it knew 
of within the government’s plans.  This flows directly from the final 
part of the Boyle test, which requires that “the supplier warned the 
United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that 
were known to the supplier but not the United States.”240  The third 
factor, as in Boyle, is necessary to prevent contractors from protect­
ing themselves merely by not disclosing their own awareness of 
risks.241 
A great strength of this test is that it is not limited to a certain 
type of claim and it is not limited by who brings the suit.  Regard­
less of whether the claim is brought under common law, under the 
FTCA, or the Constitution, the analysis of the Boyle test remains 
the same.  Just as well, this test is not limited to only suits brought 
by soldiers—as a Feres-based test would be—nor is it limited to 
claims brought by civilians.  The Boyle test can be applied to any 
type of claim by any type of plaintiff brought against a military 
contractor. 
238. Id.  The Court stated that the purpose of the factor is to select down to the 
claims that will involve discretionary decisions made by the military. Id.  Again, there 
are potential situations within this context where ancillary or tangential information 
brought about by the claim could threaten state and military interests. Id.  However, 
here, as well, those situations are not pertinent, and the political-question doctrine and 
the state-secrets privilege exist to solve those problems. 
239. In Hudgens, this was achieved through evidence admitted to show that the 
mechanics would not have seen the defect in the helicopter while performing their 
scheduled maintenance and thus that they performed their duties satisfactorily. 
Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2003). 
240. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. 
241. Id. at 512-13.  The Court stated this position: 
The third condition is necessary because, in its absence, the displacement of 
state tort law would create some incentive for the manufacturer to withhold 
knowledge of risks, since conveying that knowledge might disrupt the contract 
but withholding it would produce no liability.  We adopt this provision lest our 
effort to protect discretionary functions perversely impede them by cutting off 
information highly relevant to the discretionary decision. 
Id.  This rationale is clear and logical and the requirement is itself necessary to accom­
plish the true goal of the immunity standard: to protect the ability of the military to 
make informed discretionary decisions without the risk of interference from litigation. 
Id. 
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The test proposed by this Note provides a limiting standard 
that fairly immunizes contractors only from claims in which an in­
jury arose because of a discretionary decision by the United States 
military in how specifically to use a contractor in conducting its mis­
sion.  By precluding litigation of these claims, the military’s deci­
sion-making process is protected, and courts refrain from stepping 
in to consider questions they are not competent to address.  This 
immunity standard joins other means—including the political-ques­
tion doctrine and the state-secrets privilege—to shield sensitive mil­
itary decisions from judicial interference. 
CONCLUSION 
While the Boyle standard exists for products-procurement con­
tracts, the legal world remains in the dark on the liability situation 
of the tens of thousands of private-service contractors on the 
ground in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.  What is needed is a 
predictable test and standard for immunity that will protect state 
interests and fairly shield contractors from liability when they have 
satisfactorily completed their contractual duties.  This test implicitly 
recognizes that the military must be left to its own discretion and 
must be able to decide for itself where the appropriate balance lies 
among safety, effectiveness, cost, and efficiency.  This is a different 
standard than the standard for state tort law and is not one judges 
are competent to adjudicate.  In the case of this conflict between a 
textually powered reservation of sovereign immunity242 and the tra­
dition of mandating a remedy for a wrong, the remedy must be set 
aside for the protection of federal interests. 
An extension of Boyle into the services sphere satisfies all of 
these necessities.  As seen in Hudgens,243 this use of a modified 
government-products, contractor-immunity standard protects the 
military decision-making process and empowers the United States 
to contract for military services while fairly and justly immunizing a 
contractor from suit under the appropriate circumstances.  This sys­
tem correctly precludes recovery when the injury at the heart of the 
suit was caused by decisions of the United States.  For more than 
two decades such a system has existed for products-procurement 
contractors, while service contractors and the courts resolving the 
claims against them have been left in uncharted waters.  The chang­
ing United States military requires the solidification of law in this 
242. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). 
243. Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1333-38. 
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area.  The best and clearest solution is this Note’s proposed modifi­
cation of the Boyle test. 
Thomas Gray* 
* Thanks are due to Merritt Schnipper and Professor Bruce Miller for their 
assistance. 
